

3.2 TRANSFERABILITY AND POTENTIAL FOR MAINSTREAMING¹

According to the philosophy of the LSC project, the aim of all partnerships put in place for LSC purposes was to go beyond the promotion of social cohesion and the development of economically viable enterprise initiatives to target their resources and efforts to identify those initiatives that can have a clear impact on social cohesion in particularly disadvantaged areas and on the employment conditions and life of groups of people/communities that face special difficulty in accessing stable labour conditions. The efforts, as was seen in previous chapters, have been fruitful, however, the real success and the ultimate objective of ESF support would be that initiatives such as Local Social Capital, that have tested their effectiveness, find some continuity through mainstreaming and inclusion in regional/national employment plans.

To assess the potential for mainstreaming, the evaluation was centred on a number of key criteria that are analysed below:

- Effectiveness of national conditions and legislative structures;
- Barriers to transferability stemming from the structure and operations of the IB;
- Effectiveness of sector specific IBs;
- Typology of MPs and potential for mainstreaming these approaches;
- Value added of the IB being part of a network (instead of operating in isolation);
- Potential for trans-nationalisation of projects.

Finally, an assessment of successful steps taken towards mainstreaming was carried out.

3.2.1 Effectiveness of national conditions and legal structures

The LSC Pilot accorded considerable importance to mainstreaming and in particular the use of global grants, as set out in Article 4.2 of the ESF Regulation, but there was also scope to impact more widely on national and regional provision.

The responses of Member States² to the questionnaire on mainstreaming that was sent out by the LSC evaluation team indicated that by the end of October 2001 a number Member States had not developed in detail actions under Article 4.2 and were seeking feedback and advice from the LSC Pilot. Accordingly, a series of final findings from the evaluation of the LSC has been brought together below, to inform Member States of specific characteristics of the LSC approach that should be taken into account (see section 3.3/3.4, below).

It must be emphasised that **feedback from the Pilot projects** suggests that in mainstreaming the LSC approach the **national context is extremely important**. Evidence on the effectiveness of specific national conditions is limited, as a result of little feedback from national ESF Units. However, individual projects provide some examples where national conditions have been supportive:

- **National institutions were supportive** in the case of ASSETIP, Brussels, B: CPAS, the national welfare institution, offered MPs social allocations for 1-2 years. **Financial institutions** were also supportive: for some MPs LSC was a “bridge” to access micro-credit;
- **Public administration** used the Micropolis project (Deutsche K&J, Berlin, D) **as a model** for mainstreaming;

¹ See also *Annex 8* for details on transferability and potential for mainstreaming for each project.

² The questionnaire was sent to all Member States. Responses to the questionnaire were received from the national ESF delegations of France, United Kingdom, Italy and Spain. By October 2001, after several reminders, five other countries (AT, D, DK, FIN, S) had responded by telephone or e-mail to some of the issues raised in the questionnaire.

- **Support for dissemination** by the **Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs** which financed the publication of a good practice manual with the LSC experience in Spain (all Spanish projects);
- The **Irish Government** had made provision for the mainstreaming of a social capital programme in Ireland in 2002. The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment assumed overall responsibility for mainstreaming the programme and it, in turn, assigned responsibility for delivering the programme to the country's national training authority, FAS (PAUL, Limerick, IRL);
- National institutions seem to support mainstreaming **in the context of Global Grants** in the case of SCVO, Scotland, UK.

There are only a couple of examples of national conditions not being very supportive for mainstreaming the LSC experience, like for example:

- in the case of Huhtasuo, Jyväskylä, FIN, where there is resistance in Ministries, which view IBs as providing little/no value to ESF and do not want power over allocation of funds to be taken out of their hands;
- in the case of VFR, Osteriermark, AT, the Ministry of Employment concentrated on EQUAL and Local Employment Pacts and not interested in the MP approach.

There are also examples where the **regional structures** were **very supportive** (OATEP, Crete, EL) or where the IB itself (Diakonie, Saschen, D) is large enough with **capacity, experience and can influence** the whole territory of Saxony on social policy issues

3.2.2 Barriers to transferability stemming from the structure and operations of the IB

The majority of IBs (73%) have a “**general**” **functional scope**³, not specific to the profile of the region and are usually development agencies, labour market agencies, a couple of umbrella organisations (SCVO, Scotland, UK and VAM, Manchester, UK) and one resource centre for local NGOs (PCP, Plymouth, UK). The rest have a **specific function**, related for example to youth work (Deutsche K&J, Berlin, D), church based (Diakonie, Saschen, D), women and equal opportunities (Fund Mujeres, Caceres, ES and AV Kent, Campo de Gibraltar, ES), social inclusion and family welfare (ACAFAM, La Laguna, ES), micro-credit (ADIE, F and AFA, F), usually related to the profile of the region, for example in Campo de Gibraltar (AV Kent, ES) there are issues of discrimination against women, especially immigrants.

There is no conclusive evidence that IB structures and operations which are specific to the profile of the region could limit transferability. There are region specific structures that demonstrate **no barrier** to transferability as there are general structures that reveal **some barriers** to transferability. The evaluation demonstrated the following types of barriers related to the structure and operations of IBs:

With respect to structures of **general** scope, barriers may include:

- **Lack of experience and capacity of the IB**, illustrated in the following examples:
 - Fribørsen, Arhus, DK, with little experience and capacity, especially lack of knowledge on MP3s;
 - NERSANT, Torres Novas, P, where the IB was an association of private enterprises providing technical assistance and services to SMEs in the region and was inexperienced in managing such programmes;
 - CeSIE, Kortrijk, B, where the IB was created for the LSC project and was not self sufficient (it depended on its “mother” organisation);

³ See *Annex 2*

- **Biased territorial focus**, illustrated in the case of:
 - IFA, Karnten, AT, where the structure/network of the IB **favoured the urban capital** of the territory at the expense of the predominantly rural area;
- LSC presented by a **consortium of two organisations with different focus**, illustrated in the case of:
 - MSD, Marseilles, F: one organisation had an economic notion of LSC (CPEM), the other a social notion (MSD). In practice only one managed the project as the IB (MSD), while CPEM intervened mainly in the Steering Committee and in selection and supporting MP3s. CPEM was better networked and supported by various sectors. **Successful in its context, but difficult to transfer such a management model;**
- **Saturation in terms of programmes**, illustrated in the case of PAUL, Limerick, IRL.

With respect to structures with a **specific function**, the following aspects may constitute barriers:

- In the case of Diakonie, Sachsen, D, the IB is an umbrella structure, with capacity to cover a large territory and address social issues. Covers for instance care and housing, employment services for excluded (old, disabled, ill, etc). **Barrier to transferability** can be the **lack of similar structures** (size, capacity, influence) in other large areas or **whether the same model be applied to smaller territories**. Other barrier can be that Diakonie has better information and other links with urban areas (therefore focus of LSC was on urban areas): how effectively can rural areas be covered?
- In the case of Deutsche K&J, Berlin, D, the IB was not so “local”, contacted target districts through district level partnerships. Barrier can be the **open targeting approach** which **demotivated some partners**;
- In the case of ADIE, F, the IB operated in different regions. In some of them LSC worked in others it was not very effective. Barrier may be the **appropriateness of partners** (eg, in the rural zone of Poitou-Charentes the partnership did not work);
- In the case of AFA, F, the IB was an association which fights exclusion and manages about 30 territorial funds. Three of them were chosen for the pilot and three local IBs were set up, with **different methodologies used in implementation** sometimes. Very specific structure, difficult to transfer.

Even when there are **barriers**, these **could be overcome** through for example:

- **training** (this would be applicable in the case of NERSANT, Torres Novas, P which had inexperienced IB members, Fribørsen, Aarhus, DK and CeSIE, Kortrijk, B);
- **diversification** (applicable in the case of PAUL, Limerick, IRL, which was in danger of saturation of programmes. Could look at how to develop LSC of “bridging” type (rather than “bonding”));
- **better choice of partners** (applicable in the case of ADIE, F).

There are, however, plenty of examples where the IB structure, irrespective of whether it is specific to the profile of the region or not, contains **transferable aspects**, such as⁴:

- **good capacity and experience to manage** such programmes and delivering **ESF projects**;

⁴ Almost half of the LSC projects illustrate these aspects, namely: ReFIT, Jena, D; OATEP, Crete, EL; FVECTA, Valencia, ES; Fund Mujeres, Cáceres, ES; Consorzio BIM N&V, Cascia, I; Fund Ozanam, Zaragoza, ES; CIEM, Barcelona, ES; A V Kent, Campo de Gibraltar, ES; ASSETIP, Brussels, B; Huhtasuo, Jyväskylä, FIN; SCVO, Scotland, UK; VAM, Manchester, UK; PCP, Plymouth, UK. See Annex 8 on transferability aspects of each of the 30 projects.

- **experience in social inclusion and employment issues**, like training and qualifications for excluded people, social promotion and employment for the most disadvantaged, services and support for community groups, etc;
- **good image and reputation** in the target area;
- **local presence of the IB** for building relationships and generating projects;
- **high cooperative spirit** between multi-sector partners who work together with a common objective.

3.2.3 Effectiveness of sector specific IBs

As was mentioned in *chapter 2.1*, approximately **50%** of LSC projects supported a **mixture of MP1/2 and MP3** projects, whilst the other **50%** provided **exclusively or predominantly** support to **either MP1/2 or MP3** type micro-projects. The evidence showed that overall, IBs which specialised on MP1/2 or MP3 are not more transferable than those that did not specialise.

More specifically, **there were many sector specific IBs which were very effective in implementing the project and having an impact**, namely:

- FVECTA, Valencia, ES; NERSANT, Torres Novas, P; ADIE, F; AFA, F, **specialising in MP3**, showed that they were:
 - very effective in terms of **inclusion and employment creation**;
 - effective in **addressing needs** (esp. labour market) of socially excluded, promoting cooperation spirit between promoters, improving business competencies of promoters;
 - effective in **providing opportunities** to promoters to resolve specific problems and overcome obstacles in the creation of MP3s by very disadvantaged people.
- ASSETIP, Brussels, B; Fund Ozanam, Zaragoza, ES; Fund E&S, Madrid, ES; ACAFAM, La Laguna, ES; MSD, Marseilles, F; with **emphasis on MP3**, showed that:
 - **self-employment** is **particularly relevant as a path towards socio-labour** inclusion for specific target groups like elderly, recent immigrants and very low skilled, for all of which training to create/increase skills would have been a far longer path to labour market inclusion;
 - they were **effective in mobilising women** and bringing dynamism in an area with low associativity levels.
- LEB, Weser Ems, D; ReFIT, Jena, D; Diakonie, Saschen, D; VAM, Manchester, UK; **specialising in MP1/2**, showed that they were:
 - effective in **addressing immigrants' issues**;
 - effective in **identifying needs** for social cohesion and networking activities;
 - effectiveness depends on problems of the area and priorities of the IB;
- Of those with **emphasis on MP1/2**, only a couple showed that they were effective:
 - for **addressing needs of target groups**, improving capacity, developing links (Consortio BIM, N&V, Cascia, I);
 - in **emphasising social economy and enhancing community participation** levels (SCVO, Scotland, UK);

The rest showed effectiveness and impact in terms of social cohesion, but **little impact on job creation**, due to the following factors:

- **lack of experience with MP3** type projects (illustrated by CERFE, Pisa, I; CeSIE, Kortrijk, B; Fribørsen, Aarhus, DK; PCP, Plymouth, UK);
- **left out many rural areas**, not much evidence on impact (IFA, Kärnten, AT);

- unusual approach of the IB **not to focus on target groups**: approach was not need oriented, but activity oriented Interesting “untargeted” approach (based on the assumption that socially excluded are not able to change their situation on their own and that successful activity to reduce exclusion is often initiated by people not being extremely excluded), but **difficult to see how it could be mainstreamed** (Deutsche K&J, Berlin, D).

Finally, the rest of IBs which supported a **mix of MP1/2 and MP3** showed they were **effective**:

- in **reaching** target groups and **having an high impact** (OATEP, Crete, EL);
- in **addressing needs of socially excluded**, including employment needs (AV Kent, Campo de Gibraltar, ES);
- in **reaching especially socially excluded** people through social projects (MP1/2) (Huhtasuo, Jyväskylä, FIN);
- in assisting some of the **most disadvantaged**. Also successful in getting some most disadvantaged groups **into the system in large numbers** (through community development activities) (PAUL, Limerick, IRL).

In conclusion:

- ◇ *In many cases it was the experience of the IB that determined the choice of category to be supported (social cohesion, network creation or micro-enterprise creation;*
- ◇ *There are examples of effective implementation and impact both from IBs that specialized and those that not;*
- ◇ *IBs that specialised or emphasised MP3, were all effective and had an impact on social inclusion and employment;*
- ◇ *Even IBs that specialised on MP1/2 were effective in addressing both social inclusion and employment;*
- ◇ *Of the IBs that emphasised MP1/2, only a few did not have an impact on job creation.*

3.2.4 Typology of MPs and potential for mainstreaming these approaches

The typology of MPs was described in *chapter 2.1.2* and innovative MP actions were provided in *chapter 2.5.4.1*. All MPs were **based on target groups**, whether those were narrowly defined or whether there was a broad definition of targeting all excluded/disadvantaged groups⁵. There are many examples of types of actions that could be mainstreamed, especially the **innovative actions** described in detail in chapter 2.5.4.1, which demonstrated the capacity of LSC projects to finance innovative actions. All the evidence provided in those chapters enables us to support that:

- micro-grants can **open new fields of activity** complementing existing programmes leading to social inclusion;
- **low risk, simple self employment activities are more effective** for labour market inclusion of **highly excluded** groups;
- MP1/2 can create networks and provide information to other LSC participants related to the labour market;
- projects in the fields of education and culture can create **forward links with public sector initiatives** and therefore act as the basis for neighbourhood transformation initiatives.

⁵ For details on targeting see *chapter 2.2.1*.

However, LSC also supported some **projects that could have been assisted under mainstream programmes** (PAUL, Limerick, IRL) if they had had the funding at the time (LSC started when IBs were between mainstream programmes). Although here as well there is potential for mainstreaming, projects should **probably be funded under other mainstream programmes** (not necessarily LSC type).

3.2.5 Value added of the IB being part of a network

There is a lot of substantive evidence that there is significant value added of IBs being part of a network instead of working in isolation, in practically all stages of the LSC Pilot. More specifically:

- **Effective overall management of the programme:**
 - the IB could **utilise the experience** of each partner in a **productive way**;
 - partners **share tasks/ responsibilities** for eg local authorities contributed mostly to promotion/ publicity, specialised NGOs reached target groups they knew, public sector partners useful for dissemination, etc;
 - **representation** of a variety of local **actors/sectors in decision making**;
 - **stakeholders were embedded in ongoing discussions** regarding social inclusion issues, which maximised their interest/contribution to the Pilot;
- **Well targeted, appropriate support to MPs:**
 - formal and, in some cases also informal, partners offered support to MPs, where the IB had no capacity to do so (eg, know-how to MP3s) or because they were close to target groups or offered MPs what the IB could not (eg tutoring by entrepreneurs);
- **Effective outreach and mobilisation of target groups:**
 - the partnership approach is more effective for reaching and mobilising target groups, for example **social networks and associative movements** offered significant **outreach, dissemination and promotion** support;
 - working in partnership increases capacity to mobilise **additional resources** in a project that is very heavy on resources;
- **Personalised accompaniment:**
 - individual partners contributed to effective **accompaniment** or obtaining **methods and tools** for accompaniment;
 - where the IB had little capacity, partners often **complemented the follow-up work** of the IB for individual MPs;
- **Better dissemination and complementarity:**
 - partnership can **complement initiatives** of other actors, for example employment initiatives of municipalities, training programmes of IBs or other local associations/NGOs;
 - working in partnership implied a **wider range of actors** that contributed significantly to dissemination.

There were also a few cases of where little or no value added was found. The reasons for little value added for these specific projects are provided below:

- **partnership as a whole operating in isolation:** other actors were not encouraged to participate (IFA, Karnten, AT);
- **lack of clarity regarding roles of each partner** or lack of regular meetings and exchanges of info (CeSIE, Kortrijk, B);
- the **“open targeting approach”** (Deutsche K&J, Berlin, D) was partly responsible for a **reduction of partners** actively participating (they could not see what and how they could

do with that approach). There was **lack of strategy** on how to build and manage partnerships at district level;

- **little involvement of partners** in a not very clearly defined partnership (Fribørsen, Aarhus, DK);
- **poor information / communication channels** between IB and partners and, as a consequence, **little knowledge and contribution of partners** (ADIE, F).

In conclusion, when IBs operate as part of a partnership, the most distinguishing aspects of value added are related to exchanging/contributing experiences and contribution of partners to outreach, mobilisation and dissemination. Evidence from cases with little or no value added teaches us that partnerships work better with a focused (as opposed to open) approach, with strategy and with effective communication channels.

3.2.6 Potential for trans-nationalisation of projects

There is very little evidence supporting the trans-nationalisation of projects, with only two projects providing some information that shows potential for trans-nationalisation, namely:

- **Diakonie, Sachsen, D:** the IB was the largest actor in Saxony's social sector with political influence in the field of social policy. Established partnership and cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic. Represented in Brussels in a joint office with Diakonie organisations from other German Länder. Potential for trans-nationalisation of projects could therefore be examined with Eastern European neighbours (Poland, Czech Republic). Diakonie definitely had the capacity/experience/influence to try. Diakonie also proposed that such programmes need to intensify trans-national contact.
- **MSD, Marseilles, F:** Supported MP1/2s that related to international cooperation with the communities of origin of immigrants. Also cooperated with other LSC projects (Deutsche K&J, Berlin, D; ASSETIP, Brussels, B; CIREM, Barcelona, ES; NERSANT, Torres Novas, P) whose representatives were invited in seminars and contributed their experience.

3.2.7 Steps taken towards mainstreaming

There are a few IBs⁶ that took concrete steps towards mainstreaming the LSC experience through lobbying effectively national level structures. More specifically:

- **Deutsche K&J, Berlin, D** disseminated its approach successfully and it is **taken as a model for the implementation of ESF funds** for local social capital in Berlin's ESF-OP. However, changes are expected as the LSC pilot project "Micropolis" was mainstreamed without prior knowledge of the results of the LSC project;
- **Fund Ozanam, Zaragoza, ES** has a **new initiative** under way for **continuation of LSC** (see box 31);
- **ACAFAM, La Laguna, ES:** a new project was financed in the context of Global Grants which will give continuity to the LSC initiative in combination with micro-credit;
- **ADIE, F:** the project **is about to be mainstreamed** under measure 1OB of the programme complement of Objective 3, but concerns only MP1/2s. However, **partners were not informed of this**;

⁶ There are 8 IBs in particular that offer useful examples of concrete steps towards mainstreaming and are therefore presented individually in this section.

- **Huhtasuo, Jyväskylä, FI:** the LSC pilot project “Antenni” will continue until 2004, administered by the Supportive Association for the Third Sector Organisations in Central Finland (KYT). The official sector in the area will finance administrative costs;
- **PAUL, Limerick, IRL** disseminated information to regional and national authorities (FAS). FAS (the national training agency) is mainstreaming under Article 4.2;
- Various steps on mainstreaming taken by **SCVO, Scotland, UK:**
 - mobilisation **of potential applicants** is **now mainstreamed** through other SCVO programmes;
 - **Network of Selection Group members maintained** throughout other SCVO initiatives;
 - **SCVO** invited to submit a business plan to **deliver the mainstreamed “Global Grants” budget** across central and Southern Scotland (2001-2004).
 - other players use **MPs as peer examples of what may be achieved with limited resources**;
- Similarly, various steps on mainstreaming taken by **VAM, Manchester, UK:**
 - locally, the **Health Action Zone** invested in a **small grants fund with the Community Foundation for Greater Manchester** and the contract stipulates that this Health through Action Fund is set up and run on the ACORN⁷ model;
 - the **‘word-of-mouth’ publicity method** was felt to have been so successful in attracting excluded groups and individuals that it has been **adopted in follow on projects in Wythenshawe**;
 - the Community Foundation for Greater Manchester adopted many of the processes developed for ACORN in its own grant giving. This includes a simple application form, easy monitoring procedures, and decisions made at local level involving target groups;
 - many of the more **successful aspects of ACORN** are being **built upon in 2002** by VAM in the way it promotes and administers the **new Neighbourhood Renewal Community Chest** for Manchester;
 - the model was **adopted by several other English regions operating ESF funds**, including the **Objective One Programme** in Merseyside and East Midlands Region;
 - **VAM promoted the ACORN model to the UK Government**, which also based its guidance for **Objective Three Global Grants** on the ACORN model.

Box 31

Example of continuation of LSC in the context of global grants with involvement of existing partners

Fund Ozanam, Zaragoza, ES

The network involved in the LSC project was active in other initiatives as well, like the one related to the **continuation of the LSC project, an innovative aspect of the LSC experience**. More specifically, two of the IB’s partners, the Savings Bank Inmaculada (**Caja de Ahorros Inmaculada, CAI**) and the **Aragon Institute for Social Services (IASS)** have agreed with the Fundación Federico Ozanam to offer a **combination of micro credit and micro grant** to socially excluded groups “à la LSC”. This will work as a continuation of the LSC project and is envisaged to be organised as follows:

- the **CAI** will offer **micro-credits** with a social objective to promoters, with preferential conditions like long term payment, low interest rates (eg, 0.5%) without commission, exemption from paying the first few months until they generate income;
- the **IASS** is the body that manages global grants. It will give Federico Ozanam a sum to manage as **micro-grants**, in the same way they have managed the LSC grants. The average value of grant will be 5,000 euro per project;
- Fundación Federico Ozanam will act as **IB** for **managing** this programme, in a way similar to the LSC project;

⁷ “ACORN” was the name given to the LSC pilot project in Manchester.

- the target group will be the same as the one addressed by LSC while the eligible target area will include the whole city of Zaragoza (although emphasis will remain on the historic centre that was covered by LSC).

Apart from these concrete steps towards mainstreaming which are very encouraging, many projects took **steps towards dissemination**⁸ to regional/national authorities, increasing in this way awareness on the success of the Pilot:

- **ASSETIP, Brussels, B:** The IB **proposed to regional authorities** mechanisms for selecting and supporting micro and SMEs that enable excluded groups to re-integrate and has also **proposed to federal authorities** a medium term impact study in order to draw recommendations on the above;
- **LEB, Weser Ems, D:** The IB was approached by the district government with a view to implementing other projects. Partners showed interest in continuation of LSC activities, some have started to mobilise local (district/city) resources to ensure continuation of MPs;
- **ReFIT, Jena, D:** Single MPs were presented to the ESF monitoring committee of the Land;
- **OATEP, Crete, EL:** various steps towards dissemination:
 - Most LSC partners participate in EQUAL;
 - IB created a Cretan network of social actors;
 - IB strengthened relationship with local authorities and designed social projects for them;
 - IB guided MPs to receive support from other programmes;
 - IB will support LSC type activities through other programmes it manages (eg, EQUAL, LEADER);
- **Fund E&S, Madrid, ES:** Effective dissemination efforts through meetings with the director of the Autonomous Community of Madrid and the municipality to support publication of a good practice manual for all Spanish projects (finance was obtained from Ministry of Employment and the manual was published);
- **All Spanish LSC projects:** An event was organised in Madrid to present characteristics and results of LSC to central and autonomous administration;
- **Fund CIREM, Barcelona, ES:** Entities that worked outside the neighbourhood or that did not work with the target groups, are now studying the use of different (LSC “inspired”) instruments for addressing disadvantaged groups;
- **AFA, F:** An association (“Agency to valorise socio-economic initiatives”) was created in 2002 and has been recognised by all actors involved in LSC as appropriate to disseminate and transfer the LSC experience;
- **MSD, Marseilles, F:** Creation of a local support structure that will follow up the project with local and national financing. Key to its success is that local public partners want to follow up in this way;
- **CERFE, Pisa, I:** envisages to continue supporting MPs after the end of LSC, with its local partners.

In conclusion, successful steps towards mainstreaming were taken by eight IBs, especially in the UK, Germany, France, Finland and Spain, while various steps towards dissemination to regional/national authorities are evident in most other countries, except Austria and Denmark. This gives substance to the various aspects that were

⁸ One third of LSC projects took steps towards dissemination and their different approaches are all presented here.

shown to affect the potential for transferability and mainstreaming in all the above analysis in this chapter.

Overall Conclusions

In summary, all LSC projects offer some potential for mainstreaming, mostly in terms of overall method of delivery and management structure, support for all three types of sectors (social cohesion, creation of networks, micro-enterprise creation) and typology of MPs. The value added of the IB being part of a network suggests mainstreaming should emphasise the partnership approach piloted by LSC and the multi-sectoral project types.

We can therefore deduce that generally the LSC approach and methodology is transferable and could be mainstreamed. Such types of innovative actions are best developed by local level actors/partnerships and, provided national level structures are supportive and the few existing barriers are overcome, LSC could be mainstreamed on the basis of its merits, namely:

- ◇ *effectiveness of local level NGOs working with a variety of multi-sector partners in reaching target groups and having an impact on social inclusion and employment;*
- ◇ *flexibility of IB and continuous adaptation to local conditions;*
- ◇ *significant value added of IB operating as part of a network;*
- ◇ *effectiveness of IBs in supporting a variety of innovative actions in different sectors.*